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DECREASING THE COSTS OF JURISDICTIONAL
GRIDLOCK: MERGER OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND THE COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Mark Frederick Hoffman•
Jurisdictional conflict exists between the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), primarily due to the language of the 1974 CFTC
Act. This Act grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
certain financial instruments which, given the increasing complexity
and "hybrid" nature of such instruments, might simultaneously be
subject to SEC regulation. This Note first explores the history of the
two agencies and the statutory language giving rise to the jurisdictional conflict. This Note then examines several instances of jurisdictional conflict that resulted in extensive costs for the respective
agencies and the United States' financial markets. Specifically, this
Note addresses the impact of jurisdictional conflict in terms of
litigation costs, lost financial innovation, offshore migration of
financial instruments, and the corresponding decrease of the United
States' share in the global financial marketplace. This Note further
examines several other issues posed by interagency conflict and
suggests that the solution to these real and potential costs is a
merger of the CFTC into the larger, more experienced SEC. Finally,
this Note suggests that the current political atmosphere presents the
most favorabze opportunity to merge the agencies that has existed
since the creation of the CFTC. While a merger of the two agencies
may not eliminate all of the inefficiencies of the current system, a
single regulator could provide a lower-cost alternative to the present,
anachronistic, dual regulatory system which is faced with problems
of increasingly complex financial instruments and expanding global
competition.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was
established by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974 (CFTC Act). 1 Since its formation, this federal regulatory
commission has experienced constant jurisdictional conflict with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A source of
*
Managing Article Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform,
Volume 29, 1995. A.B. 1993, Princeton University; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan
Law School. I would like to thank Vincent Basulto, Trent Taylor, and Rebecca Rokos
for their assistance in preparation of this Note.
1.
Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4(a)
(1988)).
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conflict is the CFTC Act's grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" over
the regulation of certain designated financial instruments2
which previously were unregulated or which might have been
subject to SEC regulation.
Anticipating the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between the SEC, which is charged with regulating the general
field of "securities,"3 and the CFTC, which is charged with
regulating "commodities"4 and "futures," 5 Congress included a
savings clause in the CFTC Act. This clause provides that,
"[e]xcept as [otherwise] provided, nothing contained in [the Act]
shall (I) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Commission ... or (II)
restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . from
carrying out [its] duties and responsibilities ...."6
This effort to avoid jurisdictional conflict has proven futile
and has become "a source of uncertainty in the marketplace and
rivalry between the agencies."7 Indeed, the main problems with
interagency conflict stem from the uncertain jurisdictional
authority of each agency. 8 In an effort to solve this irreconcilable jurisdictional battle and preserve the ability of domestic

2.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1994). A "security," generally speaking, is "an undivided
interest in a common venture the value of which is subject to uncertainty." Chicago
Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1989). For a definition of"security"
under the Securities Act of 1933, see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994); for a definition of
"security" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see id. § 78c(a)(10).
4.
See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) (presenting the legislative findings which necessitate
formation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
5.
A "futures" contract is a standardized contract in which the buyer agrees to
purchase and the seller agrees to sell a specified quantity of a specified commodity at
a specified future date. Jerry W. Markham & Rita M. Stephanz, The Stock Market
Crash of 1987: The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993,
1997 (1988). Commodity futures are traded only on exchanges designated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as "contract markets." 7 U.S.C. § 6(a)
(1994). Commodity futures contracts are generally used for hedging, which allows
consumers and producers to shield themselves from the risks of adverse price fluctuations. Markham & Stephanz, supra, at 1999. Such contracts are not to be confused with
forward contracts in which the parties negotiate the quantity, time, and place of
delivery, as well as the manner of payment and deposit or margin requirements. Jerry
W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity Exchange Act:
A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 7.
6.
7 u.s.c. § 2 (1994).
7.
Egon Guttman, The Futures Trading Act of 1978: The Reaffirmation ofCFTCSEC Coordinated Jurisdiction Over Security/Commodities, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4
(1978).
8.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAw. 44 7, 461
(1995).
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financial markets to compete globally, this Note supports a
proposal to merge the CFTC into the more experienced SEC.
This proposal recognizes that altering statutory language has
proven fruitless in curing the jurisdictional battles and that
attempts at cooperation by the heads of the two agencies have
proven only temporarily successful. Delegating plenary authority to the SEC through a CFTC-SEC merger, although not the
only solution to the problems posed by jurisdictional conflict,
would significantly increase the United States' ability to compete for capital, reduce the crippling effect of jurisdictional
dispute on financial innovation, and limit the need for judicial
resolution of complex financial matters.
Although many similar proposals for restructuring American
financial markets have been raised since the dawn of the CFTC
more than twenty years ago, 9 congressional oversight committees have tended to bury the issues once the enthusiasm has
subsided and other executive or legislative matters divert attention from financial restructuring issues. 10 With the arrival
of a new Republican majority, however, the possibility of a
CFTC-SEC merger is very much alive. 11

9. For a discussion of proposals for consolidation of the agencies, see CHICAGO MERCANTILE ExcHANGE, MoDEL FOR FEDERAL F'INANCW.. 'REGULATION 2-15 (1993) [hereinafter CME
PROPOSAL] and PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANlSMS, 1988 REPORT 59--68
[hereinafter BRADY REPORT]. The Brady Report, so called because it analyzed various
market factors contributing to the 1987 stock market crash and recommended that a
single regulatory agency, possibly the Federal Reserve, coordinate critical regulatory
issues which have an impact across the related market segments. BRADY REPORT, supra,
at 69. The CME Proposal recommends consolidating numerous federal agencies which
currently possess financial regulatory authority into a single cabinet-level department.
CME PROPOSAL, supra, at 2-4. Ultimately, however, the CME Proposal is aimed at
protecting the interests of futures markets, because it recommends that trading in all
"standardized offset instruments (whether overlying financial assets or obligations,
foreign exchange, or agricultural or mineral commodities)" be regulated by a "Division
of Risk-Shifting Markets," which would closely resemble the CFTC. Id. at 9. The CME
Proposal also places responsibility for regulating all trading in security options in a
"Division of Investment Securities Markets," id. at 8-9, thereby removing jurisdiction
over security options from the SEC. For a more complete analysis of the CME Proposal,
see Coffee, supra note 8, at 451-53.
10. Id. at 44 7-48; see also 5 Loms Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURlTlES REGULATION
2497 n.61 (3d ed. 1990) (stating that "it is highly unlikely that any reasoned congressional review will occur as long as different congressional committees have oversight
responsibilities").
11.
In terms of recognizing the need to merge the financial regulators under a
single agency, perhaps the most significant, recent political event is the rise of Dan
Glickman (a Kansas Democrat and former Member of the U.S. House of Representatives) to the position of Secretary of Agriculture. Glickman has long been a strong
advocate for a CFTC-SEC merger. With a Republican majority now in Congress, the
theory behind a merger may well be put into practice. For further discussion of recent
political changes, see infra Part IIl.B.
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Although there are numerous theoretical and practical reasons favoring a merger of the two regulatory agencies, this Note
will focus particular attention on: (1) the problem of determining which agency will regulate new financial instruments 12
which frequently defy traditional classifications as "securities"
or "futures"; (2) the loss of the ability of American financial
markets to compete globally because of overlapping regulatory
jurisdiction; and (3) the need to curb inefficient litigation which
forces judges, who are less experienced in complex financial
issues than either the SEC or the CFTC, to classify financial
instruments as falling under the jurisdiction of one of the two
agencies. 13 Eradication of inter-jurisdictional conflicts, which is
critical to domestic markets, is even more important on the
international scene where "it is important to have one regulatory agency speak for [the United States] on regulatory matters."14
Part I of this Note explores the history of the CFTC and the
SEC and the source of the ongoing jurisdictional battle, briefly
explaining the financial instruments involved that contribute to
the dispute. Part II examines the evolution of numerous disputes between the agencies concerning regulatory authority
over various financial instruments and presents three examples
of judicial intervention that attempt to resolve such disputes.
Finally, Part III asserts that the jurisdictional disputes result
in numerous practical and theoretical problems which impede
financial innovation and global competition. This Note concludes that the current system of financial regulation of the
securities and futures markets is untenable in a world of
increasingly complex financial instruments and global competition. This Note recommends that the CFTC merge into the SEC
to ameliorate the detrimental impact of the ongoing CFTC-SEC
jurisdictional overlap.
12. 8e£ NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, AN 0vERvIEw OF PRooRAM 'l'RAINING AND !'IS IMPACT ON
CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES 19 (1987). The rapid growth of financial instruments
throughout the 1980s and 1990s already has spawned extensive, wasteful litigation and
inhibited innovation of such instruments. See infra Part II. No amount of tampering
with the statutory language is likely to solve such definitional problems, since the two
agencies most likely will continue to fight over the right to regulate new instruments.
13. In addition to ameliorating these major issues, a merger of the agencies could
result in numerous other efficiencies, such as a "unified system for settlement and
clearance of securities, options, and stock index futures transactions." Coffee, supra note
8, at 479. For a discussion of other benefits which would result from a CFTC-SEC
merger, including improved clearing and credit mechanisms and margin requirements,
see BRADY REPORT, supra note 9, at 59.
14. KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 15.
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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

A. Brief History of the SEC and the CFTC
1. Securities and Exchange Commission-The SEC has a
long history in the regulation of American financial markets.
The SEC was established following the stock market crash of
1929 and the ensuing congressional calls for tighter regulation
over financial markets. 15 Numerous congressional investigations
followed the 1929 Crash, eventually identifying at least two
causal factors in the Crash that needed tighter regulation:
inadequate stock margin requirements and option abuses. 16
Congress found these factors to be "at the bottom of most
manipulative [stock] operations .... "17 These factors led to passage of the Securities Act of 1933 18 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 19 in order to give the SEC authority to regulate
securities for the protection of the public.
2. Commodity Exchange Act-Although the abuses of stock
margins and options were the primary cause of the 1929 Crash,
commodity options also were the object of numerous abuses. 20
Speculation on commodities and options were blamed for the
collapse of the wheat market during the Great Depression. 21 In
response to President Franklin Roosevelt's demand for greater
regulation of commodity exchanges, Congress passed the

15.
ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 23 (1992); see
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND TIIE FuTuRE OF FINANCE 220-21 (1985) (noting that between
1920 and 1929, prior to the establishment of the SEC, "incomplete, careless or false
representations" had cost investors $25 billion).
16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934). A "margin" is
an amount deposited up front which differs somewhat for a security and a futures
contract. Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two
Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 786 (1983). A "futures
margin" is a deposit which guarantees the performance of both parties to a futures
transaction, while a "securities margin" is the lowest percentage of the purchase price
by which a purchaser can take possession of a security. Id.
17.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 747 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1934); S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934)).
18. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at
15 u.s.c. § 77 (1994)).
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994)).
20.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 759.
21.
Id.
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Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)22 in 1936, which banned trading of any options in the agricultural commodities then regulated by the CEA. 23 The stated purpose of the CEA was to "insure
fair practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchange,
and to provide some measure of control .... "24 The CEA and
the commodities markets existed in relative peace until the
1970s, when commodity prices soared and scandals rocked the
markets. 25
3. Commodity Futures Trading Commission--,-Congress
created the CFTC largely in response to regulatory gaps in the
CEA that left certain transactions unregulated. 26 Although they
ultimately lost millions, several market participants were able
to manipulate the gaps to their temporary advantage during
the early 1970s. 27 The most significant scandal of this period
was the Goldstein-Samuelson options abuses of 1972. 28
Goldstein, a twenty-six-year-old trader, manipulated a loophole
in the CEA that did not expressly prohibit the trading of
options on certain commodities such as coffee, silver, and platinum.29 Starting with only $800 in 1971, Goldstein's firm established offices worldwide and earned forty-five million dollars in
income by the end of 1972. 30 Disaster quickly followed, however,

22.
Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994)).
23.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760. The CEA stated that [i]t shall be
unlawful for any person to offer to "enter into, or confirm the execution of, any transactions involving any commodity ... if such transaction is, is of the character of, or is
commonly known to the trade as a 'privilege', 'indemnity', 'bid', 'offer', 'put', 'call',
'advance guaranty', or 'decline guaranty'...." Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545,
§ 6c(b), 49 Stat. 1491, 1494. This ban lasted for more than thirty years. Markham &
Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760. Commodities options now may be traded pursuant to 7
U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1994).
24.
U.S. CONGRESS, HOUSE, AMEND GRAIN FuTuREs ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1637, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
25.
See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 5, at 2005--06; see also Markham &
Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760-61 (discussing a loophole in the CEA, discovered in the
early 1970s, that resulted in large price increases and million dollar losses).
26.
See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760, 762-63.
27.
See id. at 760-63.
28.
See id. at 760-61; see also SEC v. Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'I 93,800 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1973); In re Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., Samuel
Brokerage, Inc. [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 71,095 (Okla.
Dep't of Securities Feb. 23, 1973).
29.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 761. In addition to coffee, silver, and
platinum, the CEA did not regulate options on sugar, foreign currencies, cocoa, copper,
lumber, mercury, palladium, plywood, propane gas, or silver coins. Philip F. Johnson,
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Policy, 29
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 n. 71 (1976).
30.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 760.
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as Goldstein was selling naked options31 and was unable to
cover his positions as prices increased. By 1973, he had left
behind $85 million in unpaid options, and many other firms
who had followed his lead similarly had lost millions of dollars
of investors' money. 32
Following this debacle, Congress enacted the CFTC Act in
1974, amending the CEA to include "all other goods and articles
... and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in."33 Thus,
in addition to the "regulated commodities" under the CEA,
Congress also sought to regulate previously unregulated commodities and markets on which they were traded. 34
B. Statutory Language and Jurisdictional Confiict
The CFTC Act35 gave birth to an agency with broad regulatory oversight of commodity futures. 36 The CFTC is subject to
a "sunset provision" that requires congressional reauthorization
of the agency every two years. 37 The most controversial aspect
of the CFTC is the congressional grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" over futures regulation, thereby preempting the field. 38

31.
"Naked options are options not backed by any physical commodity or other
means to cover the obligation. When the owner of a naked option has to cover the
contract, he must enter the market to purchase the commodity in question." Markham
& Stephanz, supra note 5, at 2006 n.71.
32.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 761.
33.
Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 404a, 106 Stat. 3625 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § la(3) (1994)).
34.
Guttman, supra note 7, at 24. For a list of previously unregulated commodities
covered by the CFTC Act, see supra note 29.
35.
7 U.S.C. § 4a (1994).
36.
Coffee, supra note 8, at 461 (noting that "[i)n creating the CFTC in 1974,
Congress seemed to preempt the field of commodity futures regulation by conferring
exclusive jurisdiction on the CFTC").
37.
7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (Supp. IV 1992). Prior to 1986, the reauthorization period was
four years, but between 1986 and 1992, the period was reduced to three years. Compare
7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1976) with id. § 16(d) (1988).
38.
Specifically, 7 U.S.C. § 2 provides:
The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... with respect to accounts,
agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is commonly
known to the trade as an "option" "privilege" "indemnity" "bid" "offer" "put"
"call", "advance guar~ty", or "de~line guar~ty"), and tr~actions in~olving
contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a
contract market ... or any other board of trade, exchange, or market ....
7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (Supp. V 1993).
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The CFTC Act also contains an SEC savings clause that has
further exacerbated the jurisdictional dispute between the SEC
and the CFTC by protecting and preserving SEC authority. 39
Despite the "savings" language, the distinct jurisdictional
boundaries of the CFTC and the SEC are very unclear. 40 The
only clear language of the CFTC Act is the so-called "Treasury
Amendment,"41 which "preclude[s] the CFTC from asserting
jurisdiction over the cash market in the ... 'specified financial
instruments ... which generally are [traded] between banks
and other sophisticated institutional participants' "42 from both
The CFTC asserts its exclusive jurisdiction through§ 5(g) of the CEA, which permits
the CFTC to "designate any board of trade as a 'contract market'. .. ." 7 U.S.C. § 7
(1994). The CFTC thus has the power to designate a contract market, "thereby
asserting exclusive jurisdiction, that has led to CFTC-SEC tensions." Guttman, supra
note 7, at 7.
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Board of Trade v. SEC, 677
F.2d 1137, 1145 (7th Cir.) (noting Congress' awkward attempt to divide jurisdiction
between the CFTC and the SEC with the proviso clauses in § 2), vacated as moot, 459
U.S. 1026 (1982).
40.
120 CONG. REC. 34, 736 (1974) [hereinafter Poage Statement] (statement of Rep.
Poage). Even prior to the passage of the CFTC Act, members of Congress themselves
anticipated the possibility of jurisdictional overlap given the unclear and broad
language of the Act:
I further understand . . . that the Securities and Exchange Commission has
jurisdiction over other types of securities, including investment contracts, and that
the term investment contract includes a broad category of arrangements and
contracts relating to investments. In this area, there may be some apparent overlap
between the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
intended jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission over trading
in futures contracts relating ... to tangible commodities. It was not intended that
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to
investment contracts be superseded, except to the extent that jurisdiction is
granted to the CFTC with respect to contracts for future delivery or options
relating, or purporting to relate, to tangible commodities .... [T]he act ... is not
intended to create any regulatory gaps.
Id. at 34,737 (emphasis added). It seems that Congress did not, in 1974, anticipate the
tremendous growth in the market for financial derivative and hybrid products which
later would develop and which now are the source of the most serious jurisdictional
disputes. See id.
41.
The "Treasury Amendment" reads:
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to
transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of
installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale
thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.
7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (Supp. V 1993).
42.
Guttman, supra note 7, at 18 (quoting S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
49-50 (1974)).
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SEC and CFTC regulation. This Amendment prevents dual
regulation of such instruments by the CFTC and bank regulatory agencies. 43
As a result of the CFTC's grant of exclusive jurisdiction, a
grant which does not exemplify legislative clarity, 44 the jurisdictional conflict first alluded to in congressional hearings has
come to fruition. 45 As former SEC Chairman Roderick Hills first
noted in 1975, "it is relatively easy to suggest that the most
basic examples of what is unambiguously a security, such as a
share of GM or AT&T, are literally within the definition of a
'commodity' .... "46 Another former SEC Chairman, Harold M.
Williams, recognized the ramifications of the broad language
included in the CEA, stating that "[t]he definition of the term
commodity ... as used in the legislation, w[as] broad-so broad,
in fact, that traditional securities and traditional securities
transactions could be construed as falling within the terms of
the statute."47
While the jurisdictional language has caused problems in the
past and will continue to do so, future problems posed by new
financial instruments, ranging from innovative derivative instruments48 to other hybrid instruments, 49 cannot be solved by

43. See COMMODITY Fl.mJREs TRADING COMM'N, OTC DERlvATIVE
REGULATION 15 (1993).

MARKETs AND THEIR

44.
Guttman, supra note 7, at 27.
45. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 460-66 (chronicling the struggles for jurisdiction
between the CFTC and the SEC from 1979 to the present); infra Part II.B-D (discussing specific instances of jurisdictional disputes).
46.
Letter from SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills to CFTC Chairman William T.
Bagley (1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'f 20,117 (Nov. 13,
1975).
4 7.
Extend Comm00ity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10285 Before the Subcomm.
on Conservation and Credit of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
185 (1978) [hereinafter Williams Statement] (statement of Harold M. Williams, Chairman, SEC).
48.
"A 'derivative' is a contract that either allows or obligates one of the parties ...
to buy or sell an asset." Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory lncrementalism, 102 YALE L.J.
1457, 1464-65 (1993). Its value "derives from the value of the 'underlying [asset],' be it
a specific stock, commodity, stock index, interest rate, or exchange rate." Id.
49.
A "hybrid" is a fairly recent financial development that cannot be classified as
either a futures or an options contract as it combines elements of both. RICHARD W.
JENNINGS ET AL., 8EcuRmEs REGULATION 25 (7th ed. 1992). lfan instrument is a commodities future or option contract, it is subject to CFTC jurisdiction; if it is categorized as
a security, it is subject to SEC jurisdiction. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a(i)-(ii) (1994). Such classification problems force courts to determine, in the words of one Seventh Circuit judge,
"whether tetrahedrons belong in square or round holes." Chicago Mercantile Exch. v.
SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989).
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current regulatory framework. which determines jurisdiction
primarily on the basis of confusing statutory classifications. 50
Further supporting the merger argument is the fact that,
since the stock market crash of 1987,51 market professionals
and investors have recognized that the markets for stocks,
futures, and options are inextricably linked and thus constitute
a single market. 52 Numerous factors link the various markets
together, including the increasing use of portfolio insurance53
and program trading, 54 both of which were implicated in the
1987 Crash and both of which link the securities and futures
markets by attempting to limit losses in one market through
activity in the other. 55
The securities and futures markets also are considered to constitute a single market because of the nature of the instruments
traded there. As former SEC Chairman Harold Williams has
noted, futures on financial securities are directly comparable to
options on securities, because "both [are] devices for risk management in relation to price fluctuations in the underlying
securities. "56 Recognizing the uniformity of the securities and
50.
See Coffee, supra note 8, at 461.
51.
Between October 13 and October 19, 1987, the New York Stock Exchange
suffered its worst decline since the Great Depression, losing more than one trillion
dollars in value. Markham & Stephanz, supra note 5, at 1993. For a more detailed
examination of the causes and impact of the 1987 Crash on financial regulatory policy
from the viewpoints of the various financial markets, see CHICAGO BD. OF TRADE,
REsl'oNSE TO THE .I'RFsIDENTIAL TASK FoRCE ON MAfuOO' MEclIANJsMs (1987); CME, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE CmCAGO MERCANTILE ExCHANGE TO EXAMINE THE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987 (1987); DIVISON OF
EcoNOMIC .ANALYSlS & DIVISION OF TRADING AND MAfuOO's, CFTC, FINAL REPORT ON ST0cK
INDEX FuTuREs AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OCTOBER 1987 (1988); DIVISION OF
MARKET REGULATION, SEC, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988); GoVERNMENT
AccoUNI'ING OmCE, FINANCIAL MARKETS: PRELIMINARY 0BsERvATIONS ON THE OcroBER 1987
CRASH, GGD-88-38 (1988); NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., AN
OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON CUR.RENT MARKET PRACTICES (1987).
52.
See BRADY REPORT, supra note 9, at vi; Jeffrey Taylor, Support Grows for SEC,
CFTC Merger, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1995, at Cl, Cl6.
53.
"Portfolio insurance," or "dynamic hedging," as it is sometimes called, is a
"computer-driven strategy of index-futures sales in a declining market and purchases
in a rising market." Markham & Stephanz, supra note 5, at 2000 n.31. Essentially, the
purchase of index futures offsets the losses suffered in a declining market, thereby
creating a floor on such losses. Id. at 1999-2000. For a discussion of portfolio insurance,
see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 2650-52.
54.
"Program trading" generally refers to trading systems, including portfolio
insurance, which are computer-driven. Los~ & SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 2650-52.
55.
Id. For further discussion on the causes behind the 1987 Crash and proposed
market responses, see id. at 2491-2505.
56.
Williams Statement, supra note 47, at 193. Williams noted further that
"securities futures and securities options raise similar policy concerns from the
perspective of their impact on the American economy. Neither securities futures nor
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futures markets, the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, chaired by Nicholas F. Brady, concluded that a single
market regulator should oversee American financial markets
because the "guiding objective should be to enhance the integrity and competitiveness of U.S. financial markets."57 Similarities between the two markets, combined with the need to avoid
the intermarket disjunction which precipitated the 1987 Crash,
suggest the need to merge the SEC and CFTC, or to at least
unify certain mechanisms across both sets of markets.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAP AND
HISTORY OF SEC-CFTC JURISDICTIONAL BATTLES

A. Consequences of Jurisdictional Overlap
The existing system of confused, overlapping regulation
between the SEC and the CFTC has resulted in significant
costs to domestic financial markets. The overlap has unnecessarily increased administrative and transaction costs, as well as
stifled financial innovation in the United States and forced such
innovation overseas. 58 Interagency efforts at cooperation have
failed, leaving a merger of the agencies as the most logical
means of coordinating regulatory policy and protecting domestic
markets from losing more of the global market share.
Overlapping jurisdiction and the conflicts resulting from
obscure jurisdictional lines have increased the administrative
costs of regulating the markets. 59 For instance, the lack of

options on securities lead directly to new capital formation." Id. at 193-94. "At the most
basic level, the prices of both futures on securities and options on securities are
primarily dependent on the same factor-the price of the underlying security." Id. at
194-95.
57.
BRADY REPORT, supra note 9, at vi.
58. SEC/CFTC Jurisdictional Issues: Hearings on H.R. 4477 Before the House
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1991) [hereinafter Merger Hearings]. Agriculture
Secretary Dan Glickman, then Representative Glickman (D-KS), stated at the hearings
that "(t]he competition should not be between the agencies, it is between us and Japan,
us and Europe, and us and the rest of the world." Id. at 39. See also Merton H. Miller
& Christopher L. Culp, Why the CFTC is an Anachronism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995,
at Al 7 ("Congress should move quickly to rethink the ... [CFTC's] mandate before the
costs and uncertainties generated by that obsolete agency drive even more of the
financial services industry abroad.").
59. See Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 245-47.
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coordination across the securities and futures markets has led
to surveillance and enforcement difficulties.Go As a result, one
market may be manipulated to benefit a position held in the
other market, leading former SEC Chairman Williams to note
that "[surveillance and enforcement] can only be effective if
both markets are regulated by the same agency."G 1
Dual and undefined regulatory authority also increases costs
through duplicative efforts in the two agencies.G 2 Besides the
absence of a single regulator with an overview of the intermarket positions of market participants,G3 there also is no single
clearing corporation.G4 Such a void can impede lenders' assessment of risk exposure and "affectD the willingness of lenders to
finance market participants. "G 5 Margins are not coordinated
across securities and futures markets and, as noted by reports
analyzing the 1987 Crash, should be rationalized across all
markets.GG
A single market regulator would benefit from the economies
of scale generated through a unified system of settlement,
clearance, and other standardized rules.G 7 The willingness of
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and other market
administrators to propose alternative, consolidated, regulatory
structures suggests that at least some of these various factors
are increasing the markets' costs and decreasing their global
market share.Gs To the extent that a single agency benefits
from economies of scale and can avoid such overlapping jurisdictional confusion and related costs, a merger of the agencies
would effectively reduce such administrative and surveillance
costs.
Interagency battles over which agency will regulate a new
financial instrument stifle financial innovation, increase costs,
and provide advantages to overseas markets.G9 Interagency

60.
See Richard Breeden, Federal Regulation. of Fin.an.cial Services: Time for a
Change, 30 FED. B. NEWS & J. 316, 317-19 (1983).
61.
Williams Statement, supra note 47, at 196; see also Breeden, supra note 60, at
318 (arguing that intermatket manipulation requires coordinated surveillance and
enforcement).
· 62.
CME PROPOSAL, supra note 9, at 3.
63.
BRADY REPORT, supra note 9, at 64.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Coffee, supra note 8, at 479.
68.
See id. at 451-52.
69.
Id. at 465; see also in.fra Part 11.B-D (discussing several jurisdictional battles
and providing examples of financial instruments that, due to jurisdictional fighting,
have moved overseas).
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disputes over which agency should regulate a new instrument
frequently lengthen the normal delay in gaining regulato:ry
approval for the instrument. 70 Assuming that the instrument is
permitted to reach financial markets at all, such time delays
chill financial innovation and impede new product development. 71 The victorious agency is left with the dubious honor of
winning the jurisdictional battle by stifling the creation of new
financial products. 72
When the interagency jurisdictional battles result in lost
innovation, the stifled financial instruments do not disappear
but merely move overseas. Between 1986 and 1991, the domestic share of the world's futures trading fell from eighty percent
to less than fifty percent. 73 This significant increase in international competition and corresponding loss in the United States'
share of the world market is largely the fault of U.S. regulators
and regulatory conflicts. 74 For example, the Toronto Stock
Exchange successfully began trading an "index participation
product"75 during the same period in which the two agencies

70.
See Coffee, supra note 8, at 465; Michael Peltz, Days ofFutures Past?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1994, at 183-84.
71.
See Coffee, supra note 8, at 464-66, 481.
72.
See id. at 481.
73.
Peltz, supra note 70, at 183. The French, German, and English markets were
up between 65% and 115% during the same period that American exchanges, specifically the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOT) and the CME were up only 39% and
36%, respectively. Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 8, at 481 (noting the significant
increase in foreign markets, particularly in Asia, Canada, and Europe, resulting in the
United States having a minority share in the global market).
Some of the increase in market shares by foreign markets can be attributed to an
increase in American investing abroad. In 1992, U.S. investors owned $190 billion in
foreign equities, as compared to $19 billion in 1982. Edward F. Green et al., Hegemony
or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50
Bus. LAW. 413, 413-14: (1995). For a discussion of the globalization of the financial
marketplace and the significant inroads that foreign markets are making in the global
marketplace, see Joseph A Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities
Markets: Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 349
(1990).
74. See Peltz, supra note 70, at 185; see also CME PROPOSAL, supra note 9, at 1
(stating that the existing regulatory structure has resisted changes in financial
markets due to international competition and thus has undermined its own effectiveness).
75.
An "index participation" is a contract of indefinite duration "based on the value
of a basket (index) of securities." Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 539
(7th Cir. 1989). "The seller of an [index participation] promises to pay the buyer the
value of the index as measured on a [certain) 'cash-out day'." Id. The buyer pays for the
participation contract in cash and may purchase on margin at the same rate as the
Federal Reserve sets for stocks, currently 50%. Id. at 540. See also Coffee, supra note
8, at 462 (discussing the "murky territory" represented by index participations, which
have qualities similar to both options and futures on indexes).
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prevented introduction of the product on domestic exchanges
through fighting over the right to regulate the instruments. 76
If there is any value in regulatory competition, "the significance of the benefits it promises are being eclipsed by the
rapid globalization of all major financial markets."77 Given the
increased costs and decreased innovation produced by the
jurisdictional overlap between the CFTC and the SEC, it may
be easier for a single, consolidated agency to address pressing
global issues than it would be for two agencies. 78 The homogeneity of financial markets and the need for a single regulatory
authority have been apparent since the 1987 Crash. Thus,
Congress should seize the politically favorable window of opportunity presented by the current Republican majority in
Congress to enact merger legislation. 79
B. Government National Mortgage
Association Disputes

The first major battle between the SEC and the CFTC relating to overlapping jurisdiction occurred in 1975, less than one
year after the CFTC's creation. The Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) had applied to the CFTC for designation as a contract
market for trading futures contracts on Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA) certificates. 80 In September 1975,
the CFTC granted the CBOT's request, and trading on GNMA

76.
See Coffee, supra note 8, at 465-66; see also infra Part 11.D (discussing the
dispute between the agencies over the issue of regulation of index participations).
Another battle between the two agencies, stemming from regulation of futures on
individual stocks, similarly moved trade in such futures to foreign markets. Coffee,
supra note 8, at 466; see also Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 257 (SEC Chairman
Breeden noting the time and cost savings for Japanese, German, French, and British
issuers who are subject only to a single regulatory authority).
Another harmful consequence of the SEC-CFTC jurisdictional dispute is the creation
of new products introduced for the purpose of avoiding regulatory constraints. Breeden,
supra note 60, at 316.
77.
Coffee, supra note 8, at 457.
78.
See id. at 4 79-80; see also Ivy Schmerken, Merging the Regulators, WALL ST. &
TECH., Mar. 1993, at 29. Schmerken notes that acting with a single voice on international matters fosters international competitiveness and our ability to act efficiently in
the global market. Id. at 30-34.
79.
For a discussion of the current favorable political environment, see infra Part
IIl.B.
80.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 773.
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futures began in October 1975. 81 The SEC formally objected to
the CFTC's action, asserting that "GNMA certificates and
Treasury bills were securities and thus should be subject
exclusively to SEC jurisdiction" and that contracts for future
delivery of such securities were still securities. 82 The SEC lost
this first battle, and the CFTC granted the CBOT permission
and issued a memorandum describing the CFTC's justification
for their assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over GNMA futures.83 In response, SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills sent a
letter to the CFTC detailing fourteen areas of CFTC jurisdiction
that the SEC felt were unresolved. 84
Although the SEC lost this battle, it retaliated three years
later in 1978 by granting an application by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE) to trade options on GNMA certificates, thereby authorizing the CBOE to "trade a derivative
instrument largely paralleling the futures contract on GNMA
certificates already traded on the CBOT."85 The CBOT objected
to this action, arguing in part that the GNMA option closely
paralleled a futures contract and that the SEC was without
authorization to permit trading of GNMA options. 86 The CBOT
sued the SEC and won an injunction pending trial in the
Seventh Circuit. 87 This injunction remained in place until the

81.
Id.
82.
Coffee, supra note 8, at 461.
83.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 773-74.
84.
Letter from SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills to CFTC Chairman William T.
Bagley (1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), 'I 20,117 (Nov. 13,
1975). Among the fourteen questions posed were those regarding the differences
between securities options contracts. and futures contracts on securities, rights of
private action under the SEC and CFTC statutes, enforcement jurisdiction, disclosure
and licensing requirements, delivery problems, and the relationship between futures
and cash markets in securities. Id. Hills further stated:

We have previously advised [the CFTC] of our view that GNMA certificates and
Treasury Bills are securities, as that term is defined in the federal securities laws.
We also believe it to be quite clear that contracts for future delivery of those
securities are also 'securities.' ...
We therefore have a situation where two distinct statutory and regulatory
schemes appear applicable, in a manner not yet precisely determined, to a variety
of transactions and relationships involving securities.
Id. This problem still has not been resolved.
85.
Coffee, supra note 8, at 461-62.
86.
Id.
87.
See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text (discussing Board of Trade v.
SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982)).
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Shad/Johnson Accord in 1982 resolved the interagency dispute
regarding GNMA options trading. 88
In 1978, the CFTC survived a second series of reauthorization hearings, despite vocal SEC opposition to reauthorization. The SEC took the opportunity tq place the ongoing
SEC-CFTC jurisdictional dispute before Congress, asking it to
give the SEC full jurisdiction over all derivative products, 89
whether options or futures. 90 SEC Chairman Williams capitalized on the hearings by expressing the SEC's position regarding
CFTC jurisdiction over GNMA certificates and the more substantive problems regarding the disputes arising from the
CFTC's claim of exclusive jurisdiction. 91
Williams also brought to the attention of Congress another
evolving jurisdictional problem that concerned the Kansas City
Board of Trade's (KCBT) petition to the CFTC to trade a futures contract on a 500 Composite Stock Index based upon the
Standard & Poor's Index. 92 The KCBT's petition ultimately

88. See infra Part 11.C (discussing the Accord and resolution of the GNMA options
issue).
89.
For a definition of a derivative instrument, see supra note 48.
90.
Coffee, supra note 8, at 461.
91.
Williams, in lengthy and assertive testimony, recommended that the "regulatory and enforcement authority for futures trading on securities and trading in the
underlying securities should be vertically integrated in one agency." Williams State·
ment, supra note 47, at 183. Williams further commented on the CFTC's assertion of
exclusive jurisdiction over trading of GNMA futures, stating:
[Exclusive jurisdiction] ignores the close connection between the futures market
for these debt securities and the markets for the underlying debt securities. Since
the [SEC] has a significant role in regulating the markets for these underlying
debt securities, there is no reason to maintain a legal scheme in which the
CFTC's jurisdiction serves only to hamper the operation of an integrated regulatory approach to these important markets.
Id. at 197. Even in 1978, Williams recognized the close connection between the
securities and futures markets, implying that they are essentially a single market. Id.
at 199.
92.
Guttman, supra note 7, at 21. The KCBT originally intended to use the Dow
Jones Industrial Stock Average (DJISA) as its stock index, but Dow Jones refused to
allow the KCBT to use its name. Jerry Knight, KC Board of Trade Proposes Dealing
Futures on Standard & Poor's Average, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1978, at Dl. The KCBT
essentially was proposing to trade a futures contract on a stock index. See Williams
Statement, supra note 47, at 188. Williams' concern was less focused on this particular
KCBT proposal than on the potential ramifications of allowing stock index futures to
be traded:
[W]e are concerned that the CFTC might grant [the KCBT application], or, in any
event, might later decide to permit trading of a futures contract on traditional
equity securities, such as GM or AT&T common stock ... that the CFTC's staff
has recognized ... may not come within the literal definition of 'commodity' ....
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resulted in a four-year moratorium on trading of stock index
futures, during which time the agencies struggled to resolve
their differences. 93
In the end, the House of Representatives voted to maintain
the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over futures contract trading,
refusing the SEC's request that it be granted regulatory authority over derivative products. 94 Congress did enact a provision,
however, requiring that the CFTC maintain communications
with the SEC, the Treasury Department, and the Federal
Reserve regarding areas of overlapping jurisdiction and consider
the views of the latter two agencies when approving applications for trading in futures on government securities. 95 Congress
did place some new requirements on the CFTC regarding
communication with other agencies during the 1978 reauthorization hearings, but it did not resolve the ongoing GNMA
conflict.
In Board of Trade v. SEC, 96 the Seventh Circuit addressed
the CBOE's 1978 application to the SEC for permission to
trade options on GNMA certificates. 97 This case presents a
prime example of the significant costs accompanying the SECCFTC jurisdictional dispute. After the CBOE's application in
1978, the CBOT, which had in 1975 won the right to trade
futures contracts on GNMA certificates, won an injunction
preventing the SEC from authorizing the CBOE's trading on

Id. For further discussion of the KCBT proposal, see Kansas City Bomber?, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 28, 1978, at 118; Aimee L. Mamer, There May Be a Future for Stock-Index
Futures, FORTUNE, Mar. 26, 1979, at 107. For further discussion of the function of stock
index futures, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 2635-39.
93.
KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 15. The interagency dispute regarding the
trading and regulation of stock-index futures ultimately was resolved in the
Shad/Johnson Accord. See infra Part 11.C (discussing the interagency jurisdictional
agreement regarding stock index futures).
94.
Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 775-76.
95.
The United States Code provides:
The [CFTC] shall maintain communications with the Department of the Treasury,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission for the purpose of keeping such agencies fully informed of
Commission activities that relate to the responsibilities of those agencies, for the
purpose of seeking the views of those agencies on such activities, and for considering the relationships between the volume and nature of investment and trading
in contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery and in securities and
financial instruments under the jurisdiction of such agencies.
7 U.S.C. § 4a(g)(2}(i) (1994).
96.
677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
97.
Id. at 1138; see also Markham & Gilberg, supra note 16, at 776.
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GNMA options. 98 Thus, for four years, until 1982, when this
case was finally decided, the jurisdictional battle prevented the
trading of GNMA options. The dispute forced the Seventh
Circuit judges to resolve a case "which present[ed] the complexity of [a] 'Gordian Knot' and which, once having been submitted, must be resolved by the court."99 This case highlights the
inadequacy of a judicial solution to complex financial questions
which should be addressed by congressional action.
The issue before the court was whether the SEC has authority to regulate options trading in GNMAs, given that GNMAs
are both "commodities" and "securities." 100 The CBOE argued
that GNMA options fall within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over commodity options, 101 while the SEC argued that the
trading of options on securities is not covered under the CEA
and thus is not within the jurisdiction of the CFTC. 102 The
court decided the case despite Congress' ongoing deliberation of

98.
Coffee, supra note 8, at 461-62.
99. Board of Trade, 677 F.2d at 1168 (Campbell, J., concurring). Judge Campbell
further scolded the two agencies for their inability to maintain communications as they
are statutorily required fu do and for forcing the judiciary to resolve an enormously
complex issue:
Not only are we expected to become expert in securities and commodities, master
a complex mass ofregulatory legislation and historical development, but we must
also discern Congressional intent and apply it to a market of financial instruments which did not exist at the time the relevant legislation was enacted. The
difficulty of this task would not disturb me if I did not perceive our role in this
matter as inappropriate.... The fact that Chief Judge Cummings and Judge
Cudahy [dissenting) were able to fashion coherent and expert solutions to the
problem is not due to the suitability of the task to judicial resolution, but to the
individual brilliance and dedication of those men.

Id.
100. Id. at 1138. The court noted the similarity of the GNMA options to futures
contracts, stating that with GNMA options, like futures, the option holder may "offset"
one position by purchasing or selling an equal and opposite position. Id. at 1139.
101. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (providing that "[t)he [CFTCJ shall have exclusive
jurisdiction ... with respect to accounts [and) agreements (including any transaction
which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an 'option' ... )")
with id. § 6c(b) (providing that "[n)o person shall offer to enter into, enter into or
confirm the execution of, any transaction ... which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an 'option' ").
102. 677 F.2d at 1142. "The dispute arises primarily because GNMA's are both
'securities' under [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), and
'commodities' under CEA§ 2(a)(l), 7 U.S.C. § 2." Id. Recall that Congress ratified the
ban on options trading when it created the CFTC in 1975, stipulating that the ban will
remain until the CFTC proposes to lift it. Id. at 1143. Thus, the CFTC argued, and the
court agreed, that "[t)he CFTC has not lifted the ban on GNMA options trading and
therefore the CBOE cannot trade GNMA options." Id. at 1144 (footnote omitted).
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the Accord. The court held that the CFTC has jurisdiction over
GNMA options 103 because GNMA options are not securities,
and thus are not subject to SEC regulation. 104 The dissenting
opinion sharply criticized the majority's holding. 105 This case,
however, later was rendered moot by Congress' adoption of the
Accord. 106
C. Shad/Johnson Accord of 1982 and
the 1984 Compromise
In the midst of the debate over which agency ultimately
would regulate options on GNMA certificates, and during the
protracted litigation previously described, the head of the SEC,
John Shad, and the head of the CFTC, Philip Johnson, agreed
to settle their jurisdictional dispute with regard to the certificates107 and adopted the Shad/Johnson Accord 108 (Accord).
Under the Accord, the two agencies divided jurisdiction over
options, with the SEC obtaining regulatory authority over
options on securities, including those generally exempted from
federal securities laws, 109 and "jurisdiction over options on
groups or indexes of securities and options on foreign currency

103. Id. at 1138.
104. Id. at 1146.
105. Judge Cudahy stated that "the majority fails at almost every tum to meet the
tests of plain language, congressional intent, historical context and practical result. n Id.
at 1168 (Cudahy J., dissenting). He further noted that, in the Accord, the SEC and the
CFTC
have now resolved their differences in a way which is consistent with almost any
decision by us except the strained conclusion of the majority.... Not only have
we done our best to frustrate the efforts of the concerned regulatory agencies ...
but we have managed to conclude that an agency of long experience and high
reputation must fully abandon its field of expertise in favor of a new and relatively untested regulatory body of uncertain prospects.

Id. at 1184 (footnote omitted).
106. See infra Part 11.C.
107. See CFTC and SEC Jurisdictumal Agreement: Proposed Legislation, [19801982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982).
108. See KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 15.
109. See Don L. Horwitz & Jerry W. Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission: Scene II, 39 Bus. LAW. 67, 73 (1983). GNMA certificates and
certificates of deposit are examples of securities generally exempted from federal
securities laws. Id.
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traded on securities exchanges."110 The CFTC obtained jurisdiction over futures contracts on exempted securities and groups
of securities or indexes, over options on futures contracts for
such indexes, and over options on foreign currency traded on
commodity exchanges. 111 In addition, the Accord prohibited
trading of futures contracts and options on futures contracts on
individual corporate and municipal securities. 112 Thus, the
CFTC ultimately was free to authorize futures contracts, option
contracts on commodities, and currencies, but could not authorize options or futures contracts on equity securities. 113
·
Despite the questionable power of the two agencies to divide
up jurisdictional authority, 114 Congress ratified the Accord with
only minor changes. 115 As later developments demonstrated, 116
the Accord "addressed a symptom rather than the problem," as

110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Coffee, supra note 8, at 462 (noting that the CFTC still could authorize futures
on securities indexes); see also infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing
the 1984 compromise between the CFTC and the SEC regarding limits on the CFTC's
ability to trade stock index futures).
114. See Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1142 n.8 (7th Cir.) (stating that
"[w]e cannot allow the CFTC and SEC to reapportion their jurisdictions in the face of
a clear, contrary statutory mandate"), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982); Coffee,
supra note 8, at 462.
115. Coffee, supra note 8, at 462. In 1982, the CEA was amended to reflect the
Accord. Horwitz & Markham, supra note 109, at 76. The Accord provides for the
following:
(i) ... [T]he [CFTC] shall have no jurisdiction to designate a board of trade as
a contract market for any transaction whereby any party to such transaction
acquires any put, call, or other option on one or more securities ... including any
group or index of such securities, or any interest therein or based on the value
thereof.

(ii) ... [T]he Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts ... for future delivery of a group or index of securities ....

(iv)(I) The Commission shall consult with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to any application ... for designation as a contract market
with respect to any contract of sale (or option on such contract) for future delivery
of a group or index of securities.
7 U.S.C. § 2a (1994).
116. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing the 1984 agreement
between the CFTC and the SEC); infra Part 11.D (discussing developments which
occurred after the stock market crash of 1987).
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options are but one among many financial instruments having
attributes of both securities and futures contracts. 117
The Accord also was not the final word on stock index futures contracts. Under the Accord, the CFTC was restricted in
the types or composition of the stock indexes "on which it could
permit futures contracts to be traded." 118 The Accord, however,
contained the "Substantial Segment Criterion," which prevented trading in certain subindexes "that [amounted] to only a
thinly-disguised 'surrogate' for trading in individual stocks." 119
Given the disparate interests of the two agencies, conflict
was inevitable. In 1984, the CFTC approved a proposal for a
subindex futures contract of the CME. 120 Avoiding further
litigation, the two agencies reached a compromise, agreeing to
a set of five minimum criteria for "applications by boards of
trade [i.e. futures exchanges] for designation as a contract
market for futures contracts on a non-diversified stock index."121 The criteria are: (1) an index must contain at least
twenty-five domestic securities; (2) the aggregate capitalization
of the securities must be at least seventy-five billion dollars; (3)
no single security can represent more than twenty-five percent
of the index's aggregate capitalization; (4) no three securities
can account for more than forty-five percent of the index; and
(5) special rules must be applied to link weights to firm capitalization for noncapitalization weighted indexes. 122
While the agencies may have thought that this compromise
would avert potentially extensive litigation, the compromise
criteria were not well-received by the CFTC's clientele. Following the agreement, the CBOT sued the two agencies over both

117. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 1989). Given the
hybrid nature of options, the 1980-1982 dispute over options could be played out with
every new financial instrument. Id.
118. Coffee, supra note 8, at 463.
119. Id. The CFTC amendment to the CEA states that "[s]uch group or index of
securities shall be ... a widely published measure of, and shall reflect, the market for
all publicly traded equity or debt securities, or a substantial segment thereof" 7 U.S.C.
§ 2a(ii)(III) (1994) (emphasis added).
120. Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional
Competition Between the SEC, the CFTC and Other Agencies, 4 J. FuTuru:s MARKETS
267, 375 (1984).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 379-80; see Designation Criteria for Futures Contracts and Options on
Futures Contracts Involving Non-Diversified Stock Indexes of Domestic Issues, 49 Fed.
Reg. 2884 (1984); Coffee, supra note 8, at 464. Noting the cost in terms of lost competition abroad, Professor Coffee has stated that "[f]oreign futures exchanges have begun
to trade futures on individual stocks, thus underscoring the cost of the SEC's 'substantial segment' criterion." Id. at 466.
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the substance of the new agreement and the informal administrative procedures the agencies followed in promulgating the
agreement. 123
Thus, the Accord and the 1984 compromise, while representing positive steps in cooperation between the two agencies,
were the result of a jurisdictional dispute that promises to
continue unless more substantive action is taken. The Accord
is problematic because although it put an end to the costly
delay in permitting the trading of GNMA options, it also prohibited any futures trading on individual equities. This action
did not eliminate such trading but merely moved it overseas.
Furthermore, the Accord, while attempting to resolve the
issues surrounding stock index futures, failed to do so to the
satisfaction of the SEC. This failure has further restricted
financial innovation because it has resulted in questionable
interagency collusion, such as the 1984 compromise, and
threats of more litigation by the regulatory clients themselves.

D. The 1987 Crash, the Index Participation
Dispute, and the Future
In the wake of the 1987 Crash, the SEC again petitioned
Congress to obtain greater regulatory authority over financial
markets, noting that the connections between all financial
markets effectively create a single market requiring more
concentrated regulatory authority. 124

123. Kane, supra note 120, at 375. The CFTC's clientele were upset because, they
argued, "these criteria surrender stock index opportunities for futures exchanges that
had been reserved in the 1982 legislation . . . . In effect, the CFTC's regulatory
clientele is asking the courts to force the agency to protect its statutory turf." Id. For
a more detailed description of the agency's battles over stock index futures, see id. at
377-80.
124. Coffee, supra note 8, at 460-63. SEC Chairman David S. Ruder asked Congress to "transform the [SEC] into a regulatory superpower by vastly expanding its
authority over the nation's stock, options and futures markets" and to transfer from the
CFTC to the SEC authority to regulate stock index futures contracts. See David A.
Vise, Chairman Urges Expanded SEC Role in Markets, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1988, at Al.
Ruder also voiced the commonly accepted opinion that the securities and futures
markets really constitute a single market and stated that it was "inappropriate for the
CFTC to have regulatory authority over stock index futures" due to their impact on the
securities markets. Id. For a discussion of various exchange proposals in the aftermath
of the 1987 Crash, see supra note 51.
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In 1989, another jurisdictional dispute brought the issue of
allocation of regulatory authority before the judges of the
Seventh Circuit, this time in a debate over which agency
should regulate index participations (IPs). 125 Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC 126 involved requests to trade IPs by the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), and the CBOE, all of which the SEC had granted in
April 1989. 127
The court recognized several of the past resolutions concerning financial instruments with mixed security-futures attributes, 128 and noted that the problem was that "the statute
[7 U.S.C. § 2) does not define either 'contracts ... for future
delivery' or 'option.' "129 The court stated that the subject would
continue to plague the courts "[u]nless Congress changes the
allocation of jurisdiction between the agencies. "130 After a
lengthy review of the various factors comprising a "security"
and a "futures contract," the court concluded that "[t]he only
thing of which we are sure is that an IP is not an option on a
security." 131 The court noted that the case was merely an analog to the 1982 litigation concerning GNMA options and apparently was frustrated by the agencies' or Congress' inability to
solve these persistent jurisdictional disputes. 132

125. For a definition of "index participation," see supra note 75.
126. 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 540--41.
128. Id. at 539. If an instrument is both a security and a futures contract, the
CFTC has jurisdiction, whereas if the instrument is both a futures contract and an
option on a security, the SEC has jurisdiction. Id.
129. Id. The opinion also indicated that the courts may not be the proper forum for
solving such interagency jurisdictional disputes, noting that this case is merely another
example of the circumstances giving rise to the 1982 litigation and the subsequent
Accord, which would be played out in the future, as in this case, about each new
financial instrument. See id. at 544. The court concluded that "[o]nly merger of the
agencies or functional separation in the statute can avoid continual conflict." Id.
130. Id. at 545.
131. Id. at 546. The court noted the agencies' own confusion over the proper
jurisdictional domain, stating:
When we asked the SEC's Solicitor during oral argument whether the CFTC
could have granted such an [IP] application [before the SEC], he said yes ....
When we persisted with the question whether the CFTC could grant the identical
application, filed by the CBOT and CME in 1989 (after the SEC's decision), the
Solicitor said no .... Yet this principle of first-come-first-served finds no support
in the '34 Act or the CEA. Either IPs are futures contracts or they aren't.

Id. at 548.
132. See id. at 549-50.
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More recently, the question of whether particular hybrid
instruments in the oil industry are forward or futures contracts
was the subject of a judicial ruling in Transnor Ltd. v. BP
North America Petroleum. 133 The court held in favor of CFTC
jurisdiction, finding that 15-day Brent transactions 134 constituted futures contracts. 135 In response to the numerous inquiries
that the CFTC received in response to this holding, former
CFTC Chairwoman Wendy Gramm announced the agency's
disagreement with the court's finding, stating that "the Commission's Off-Exchange Staff Task Force has taken the view
that the 15-day Brent contracts are not within the Commission's jurisdiction over futures contracts because they are
within the category of transactions covered by the so-called
forward contract exclusion of the Commodity Exchange Act." 136
Cases such as Chicago Mercantile and Transnor fail to recognize the severely disruptive aftershocks in the affected markets
and thus exemplify the inability of the judicial system to interpret and categorize the jurisdiction of existing and developing
hybrid instruments. Furthermore, placing the categorization of
133. 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In Transnor, the plaintiff purchased two
cargos of North Sea Crude Oil in December 1985 for delivery in March 1986. Id. at
1474. The plaintiff refused to take delivery of the oil because the oil's value had
declined subsequent to entering into the contract. Id.
134. A "15-day Brent" contract "refers to cargoes which were sold for delivery
during a specific forward month, on 15-days notice to the buyer of the date on which
the cargo should be lifted." Id. at 1485-86. The court struggled with the issue of
whether a contract for purchase of oil for delivery from the Brent Oil fields in the
North Sea was a forward contract, which is left undefined under the CEA, or a futures
contract subject to CFTC jurisdiction. Id. at 1475, 1489. The particular contract in
question was "a hybrid of a futures contract and a forward contract." Id. at 1489.
Relying on prior judicial determinations that forward contracts are contracts "in which
the commercial parties intend and can accommodate physical transfer of the actual
commodity," and determining that no such intent existed between these parties, the
court held that the contract involved was a futures contract. Id. at 1489, 1493. Thomas
Russo has stated that "(i]fyou read the [Chicago Mercantile] decision together with the
Transnor decision, it is very hard to imagine something out there that isn't the futures
contract." Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 124. Russo criticized the holding, stating
that "if the definition of a futures contract is so broad as to include any contract where
there is any element of futurity, and the forward contract exclusion from the CEA is so
narrow, then many markets that exist today are illegal." Id. at 131.
135. 738 F. Supp. at 1493.
136. Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 237. Although Transnor does not directly
address the jurisdictional overlap between the SEC and the CFTC, it nonetheless
reveals a significant definitional shortfall of the CEA and represents a broadening of
CFTC jurisdiction through judicial action, a broadening which the CFTC itself argued
was unwarranted. Id. Such a broad definition of a "futures contract" could result in
further SEC/CFTC jurisdictional conflict as the agencies, the courts, and the markets
struggle to adapt the dual and incomplete regulatory system to a wide range of hybrid
financial instruments.
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new hybrid instruments in the hands of the courts leaves the
agencies to fix the detrimental market effects, 137 and, as shown
in Transnor, results in a disjuncture between the views of the
agency and the judiciary.
The main question posed by Transnor is whether the courts
provide an appropriate forum for deciding issues of such magnitude, given the frustration of the courts in asserting responsibility which they view as properly residing elsewhere. 138 Such
costly and protracted litigation raises other serious issues, such
as negative impact on financial innovation, 139 loss of market
share to foreign markets, 140 and inexpert results. 141 One commentator has stated that the CFTC's success in impeding the
introduction of IPs through the SEC and the SEC's victory in
barring non-diversified stock index futures are "dubious milestones in the history of agency warfare. In the end, the capital
markets would be freer ... if both agencies had lost." 142 As the
court noted in Chicago Mercantile, a merger of the two agencies
would solve the jurisdictional battles.
Indeed, several new, potentially explosive financial instruments may soon create additional jurisdictional battles between
the two agencies. While the SEC and the CFTC have, after two
years, resolved the immediate threat to the agencies' fragile
137. Thomas Russo noted the ambiguity of the phrase "contracts for future delivery" and the resulting potential problems: "[First,] it enables an exchange through
litigation to prevent any new product from happening. The second thing it does ... as
it is doing with the present oil market as we speak, it gets to disrupt existing markets." Id. at 124; see also id. at 258 (SEC Chairman Richard Breeden noting that
current law permits a futures exchange to sue repeatedly to block new products,
thereby further hampering competition and stifling innovation).
138. See supra note 99.
139. Professor Coffee, summing up the jurisdictional battles between 1980 and
1989, stated that,
[o]n one hand, the CFTC blocked the index participations that both the CBOE
and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange sought to trade, and, on the other, the SEC
severely restricted non-diversified stock index futures. Neither side stands out as
the villain or the hero in this story; rather, each side generated a regulatory
penumbra around its core statutory jurisdiction within which it was able to bar
firms regulated by the other from entering.
Coffee, supra note 8, at 465-66.
140. For example, before 1989, when the Seventh Circuit decided the IP issue in
Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), the Toronto Stock
Exchange was successfully trading an IP product. Philip M. Johnson, Refl.ections on the
CFTC I SEC Jurisdictional Dispute, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS:
ISSUES AND POLICIES 145 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992).
141. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
142. Coffee, supra note 8, at 481.
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regulatory equilibrium posed by the Buy-write Option Unitary
Derivatives (BOUNDS) instrument, 143 more threats are yet to
come. According to one commentator, "[t]he dividing line between SEC and CFTC jurisdiction continues to blur, and some
think it will fade completely. "144 The BOUNDS instrument, containing elements of both a security and a futures contract,
"highlights the problems inherent in adapting an innovative
hybrid product to a creaking regulatory structure."145 Such
problems cannot be remedied until Congress recognizes the
tremendous practical and theoretical advantages of a single
regulatory agency governing both the securities and futures
markets.
III. THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OVERLAP AND THE
CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Just as the interagency jurisdictional conflict has resulted in
several costly and inefficient battles, there are more fundamental, substantive problems inherent in a bifurcated regulatory
system. These problems cannot be solved merely by tampering
with the statutory language or by encouraging greater communication between the two agencies.

A. Theoretical Consequences
Supporters of the current dual regulatory system argue that
the presence of two agencies supports a favorable competitive
environment, results in less costly and imposing regulation,

143. CBOE to Launch Index Options on Real Estate and Global Telecommunications
Stocks, SEC. WEEK, Feb. 20, 1995, at 6 (noting that the CBOE has filed with the SEC
to trade BOUNDS). A BOUNDS instrument operates as the equivalent of "simultaneously writing a call option and purchasing the underlying stock." Id. For more than
two years, the CFTC and the SEC have debated the jurisdictional authority over this
derivative product, with the CFTC recently deciding that BOUNDS are not futures
contracts. Hal Lux, New Deriuatiue Product Rises from a Regulatory Graveyard: Two
Years After Design, 'BOUNDS' May Start Trading, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Nov. 14,
1994, at 4, 4. Exchanges now will seek permission to trade BOUNDS from the SEC. Id.
144. Hal Lux, Forgotten but Not Gone: Now Into Its Second Year Without a Leader,
the CFTC Risks Becoming Irrelevant, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., Jan. 31, 1993, at 16, 19.
145. See Lux, supra note 143, at 9.
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and encourages financial innovation. According to Professor
Coffee, the theory of regulatory competition146 rests on three
pillars: (1) under certain assumptions, interjurisdictional competition produces a Pareto-optimal outcome; 147 (2) regulators,
like corporate managers, seek to maximize the "value" of their
agencies; 148 and (3) regulators represent their market clientele.149 However, as Professor Coffee notes, the regulatory
competition theory breaks down when used to support the
SEC-CFTC dual regulatory system. 150
Among the several theoretical problems with the current
dual regulatory system are that it undermines public confidence in our system of financial regulation, 151 subjects the
CFTC to agency capture, 152 results in collusive, oligopolistic
conditions, 153 and produces a "race-to-the-bottom," or "forum
shopping" for the markets subject to the least stringent regulation.154
First, the dual regulatory system has a negative impact on
the public's perception of market regulation. Former SEC
Chairman Philip Johnson has suggested that the movement to

146. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 453-57. For more discussion of regulatory
competition, see Steven Kelman, The Ethics of Regulatory Competition, REG.,
May-June 1982, at 39, 39-44 (discussing environmental and other federal regulations and the "race-to-the-bottom" argument of state and federal regulation); see also
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON.
23 (1983) (discussing the coexistence of federal and state regulatory systems in the
context of antitrust regulation).
147. Coffee, supra note 8, at 453 (citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (discussing national versus local methods of
allocating public expenditures and comparing public and private markets)). "Paretooptimality" generally refers to a condition in which no person can be made better off
without maltlng another person worse off; thus a "Pareto superior" alternative is one
which leaves at least one person better off and "no one worse off." DAVID W. BARNES &
LYNN A STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-12 (1992). Professor
Coffee discounts this regulatory competition pillar, however, arguing in part that its
assumptions of no externalities and single variable (least costly) analysis are unrealistic. Coffee, supra note 8, at 453-54.
148. Coffee, supra note 8, at 454. Professor Coffee dismisses this regulatory
competition pillar on the ground that it ignores principal/agent problems. Id.
149. Id. Professor Coffee argues that this third pillar of the regulatory competition
model may lead to agency "capture." Id.
150. Id. at 453-57.
151. See Johnson, supra note 140, at 147-48; KATZENBACH, supra note 12, at 18.
152. Coffee, supra note 8, at 474-75; see also Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Agencies in
Conflict: Overlapping Agencies and the Legitimacy of the Administrative Process, 33
VAND. L. REV. 101, 109-12 (1980) (discussing generally capture and administrative
legitimacy).
153. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 471-72.
154. See id. at 475-77; Williams Statement, supra note 47, at 202.
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merge the two agencies is due in part to the public antagonism
toward futures exchanges and the many scandals in the futures
markets in the early years of the CFTC. 155 Thus, the existence
of two regulatory agencies overseeing essentially a single
market may undermine public confidence in market safety and
increase the possibility of certain financial instruments slipping
between the cracks and avoiding regulation. 156
While the public perception argument really only supports a
transformation, or "tightening," of regulatory oversight, the
agency capture argument lends stronger support to the idea of
merging the SEC and the CFTC. The CFTC, newer and onefourth the size of the SEC, 157 is more prone to agency capture
than the SEC. 158 A member of the SEC's senior staff has stated
that "the CFTC is [the futures markets'] regulator as well as
the chamber of commerce and the promoter for the futures
industry." 159 Agency capture happens when smaller groups
prevail at the expense of larger, less organized groups. 160 Indeed, the CFTC's frequent demonstrations of its political muscle in many reauthorization hearings since 1974 have revealed
the desire of the CFTC and the futures markets it regulates to
remain independent of the SEC. 161
Despite the significant costs of the SEC-CFTC jurisdictional
conflict, Mary Schapiro, the Chairwoman of the CFTC, would
likely support the cause of the "politically forceful Chicago
futures markets" in actively resisting another round of merger
or consolidation proposals. 162 Given that the smaller the agency,
the more likely it is that capture will occur, a larger agency,

155. Johnson, supra note 140, at 147-48.
156. See Breeden, supra note 60, at 316.
157. The SEC, however, has more than three times the budget of the CFTC.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78kk (Supp. V 1993) (SEC congressional authorization exceeded
$178 million in fiscal year (FY) 1990 and $212 million in FY 1991) with 7 U.S.C.
§ 16(d) (Supp. V 1993) (CFTC authorization was exactly $53 million in FY 1993 and
$60 million in FY 1994). See also Taylor, supra note 52, at Cl (quoting the statement
by CFTC Chairwoman Schapiro, in response to the Leach/Wyden merger bill, that
"[t]here aren't any significant savings to be achieved by merging the agencies ....
We're already a small agency with ... little administrative staff').
158. "Agency capture" occurs when a rent-seeking group, i.e., self-interested
members of a particular constituency, tries to influence governmental processes to
obtain gainful outcomes for the group. Coffee, supra note 8, at 35.
159. See KllADEMIAN, supra note 15, at 155.
160. Coffee, supra note 8, at 473-74.
161. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 120, at 375.
162. Taylor, supra note 52, at Cl.
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such as the SEC or a merged SEC/CFTC agency with a broader
jurisdictional scope, could more effectively prevent capture of
the CFTC.
.
The theory of regulatory competition also fails to recognize
that the existence of two regulatory agencies may result not in
a competitive market but rather in an environment more closely
resembling an oligopolistic market where the two agencies can
easily collude and "cooperate" to achieve, as Professor Coffee
states, "the quiet life." 163 Given that the SEC and the CFTC are
the only two agencies in the field, they can collude very easily
and lawfully. 164 In fact, when the agencies reach an agreement,
others applaud their cooperation for being "statesmanlike," and
both the courts and Congress tend to adopt the agencies' agreement, 165 rather than subject the agreement to the scrutiny of
antitrust laws that govern collusive activities in the private
realm. 166
This state of oligopolistic "competition," which really produces no competition at all, compounds the negative impact of
a dual regulatory system, because markets and consumers are
subjected to the increased costs associated with the SEC-CFTC
jurisdictional disputes 167 and then further burdened by the
accommodating solutions achieved between the two agencies. 168
A competitive environment cannot be achieved in a regulatory
system comprised of only two agencies. Merger of the agencies
into a single regulatory body, while effectively creating a monopoly over financial regulation, would not produce the negative
impact and deadweight losses associated with monopolies in

163. Coffee, supra note 8, at 472.
164. See, e.g., supra Part 11.C (discussing the Shad/Johnson Accord of 1982, later
adopted by Congress, in which the two agencies mutually agreed to settle a number of
interagency jurisdictional disputes).
165. Coffee, supra note 8, at 471. Professor Coffee further notes:
In reality, the actual environment in which administrative agencies function
resembles not the atomistic market of perfect competition but a heavily concentrated industry in which there are usually no more than two dominant firms.
In such an environment, absent strict enforcement, oligopoly is highly likely in the
private sector, and even more predictable in the public sector, where there is no
legal barrier to such "cooperation. n

Id. at 472.
166. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
167. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
168. See supra Part 11.C-D.
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the private sector, because the benefits of a single regulatory
monopoly accrues to the public. The benefits may include the
elimination of costly court battles attempting to define interagency jurisdictional boundaries, a corresponding increase in
financial innovation as new instruments either are permitted
to enter or are banned from the market more rapidly, and a
single regulatory voice representing American markets in the
global environment. 169
Finally, another problem of a dual regulatory environment is
the "race-to-the-bottom" scenario, in which interagency competition, to the extent that it does exist, results in sub-optimal
regulation as agencies seek to attract clients by lowering regulatory standards. 170 Under this scenario, when one market or
regulator has achieved an "optimal" level of regulation, its
competitor will lower its regulatory standards, thereby attracting the mobile population while externalizing the harms of the
sub-optimal regulation onto the other market regulator. 171 In
response, the first regulator will lower its own standards, and
a downward spiral ensues. 172
In the context of the SEC and the CFTC, the breakdown over
clear interagency jurisdictional boundaries renders the financial markets vulnerable to intentional abuses of the regulatory
gaps. A market actor "presented with a choice between either
of two functionally similar markets· ... will seek the market
representing the 'lowest common denominator' of regulation. "173
Thus, under the current regulatory regime, there is the potential for "forum shopping" and a sub-optimal level of regulation.174 To the extent that the race-to-the-bottom scenario
creates inefficient and sub-optimal regulation in financial

169. Although a single regulatory authority might better oversee the financial
markets, avoid or limit agency capture, and enhance the efficient workings of the
market, such gains initially could be offset by internal wars between SEC and former
CFTC personnel and by the practical impact of merging two separate bureaucratic
cultures.
170. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 475.
171. See id. at 476-77.
172. Id.
173. Williams Statement, supra note 47, at 190.
174. For a further discussion of the "race-to-the-bottom" scenario, see Richard B.
Stewart, Pyramids ofSacrifice? Problems ofFederalism in Mandating State Implementation of Nati-Onal Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (commenting
that "any individual state . . . may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high
environmental standards that entail substantial costs ... for fear that the resulting
environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to other areas
with lower standards").

SPRING 1995)

Merger of the SEC and the CFTC ·

711

markets, consolidation of regulatory authority into a single
agency could solve the problem. 175
One example of the race-to-the-bottom scenario in the SECCFTC jurisdictional conflict is the CFTC's unwillingness, even
since the 1987 Crash, to increase margin requirements to bring
them in-line with the requirements that the Federal Reserve
currently imposes on securities markets. 176 Differing margin
requirements in the securities and futures markets arguably
undermine the safety and stability of the markets. 177 With the
ever increasing number of hybrid instruments in the financial
markets, the two agencies will undoubtedly continue to assert
conflicting jurisdiction over such instruments, thereby encouraging this destructive scenario.
B. Current Political Environment

The new Republican majority could have a substantial impact in favor of the consolidation of regulatory authority in a
single agency. Recently, congressional oversight committees
have posed an obstacle to any change in the financial regulatory structure, because such committees are extremely reluctant to relinquish any authority over the agencies that they
oversee. 178 The House Agriculture Committee has refused to
175. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competitwn: Rethinking the 'Raceto-the·Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N. Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1210 (1992).
176. See Gene Ramos, SEC, CFTC Chiefs Differ on Bill Seeking to Merge Two
Agencies, REUTER Bus. REP., Feb. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSRPT
File (discussing the recent Leach/Wyden bill and its proposal to consolidate the marginsetting function into a single regulatory agency).
177. See Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 255. Former SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden has stated that

[a) low margin encourages speculative trading . . . creat[ing the) illusion of
liquidity in the stock index futures markets. When market conditions become
extreme, however, these highly leveraged traders withdraw from the market and
the mirage of liquidity disappears almost instantly. When that happens, prices
fall rapidly in the futures markets. Those price declines are then transmitted to
the stock market through index arbitrage.

Id. at 253.
178. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 447-48. The House and Senate Agriculture
Committees have jurisdiction over the CFTC, while the Senate Banking Committee
and the House Energy and Commerce Committee oversee the SEC. See Nathaniel C.
Nash, The Battle Over Regulatwn of the Futures Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990,
at Cl2.
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give up its power over the CFTC, and the commodity futures
industry has been opposed to SEC oversight because the industry believes that the SEC is insensitive to its needs. 179 Republicans, however, generally have been strong proponents of some
type of merger or regulatory reform proposal, 180 and their
congressional majority could significantly aid an interagency
merger. For example, in the first weeks of the new congressional session, Representatives Jim Leach (R-IA) and Ron Wyden
(D-OR) introduced a bill, HR 718, that would effectively merge
the SEC and the CFTC into a single regulatory agency to be
called the "Markets and Trading Commission. "181
Furthermore, support from key Democrats also may aid an
interagency merger. Dan Glickman, a former Democratic member of the House of Representatives from Kansas who served
on the House Agricultural Committee and is currently the
Secretary of Agriculture, 182 has previously introduced legislation to merge the SEC and the CFTC into a single regulatory
agency. 183 The new Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, also has
voiced support for a merger proposal. 184
179. Markham & Stephanz, supra note 5, at 2030; see also Taylor, supra note 52,
at Cl (noting that the Chicago futures markets have vowed to strike down legislative
attempts to merge the agencies).
180. The Bush Administration initially favored a merger proposal, or at least
favored granting the SEC more authority over certain instruments based on securities.
See White House to Propose SEC Receive Jurisdiction Over Stock Index Futures, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 731 (May 11, 1990); see generally SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN .AFFAIRS, THE MARKET REFORM ACT OF 1990, S. REP. No.
300, lOlST CONG., 2D SESS. (1990).
181. See Angela Droite, GAO Official Urges Careful Weighing of Costs in Proposed
CFTCISEC Merger, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 673-74 (May 5, 1995). For
further discussion of the Leach/Wyden legislative merger proposal, see Cindy
Skryzycki, A Super-Agency for Markets; The SEC and the CFTC: Match With a
Reluctant Bride, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1995, at Fl (noting that the Leach/Wyden bill is
being sent to the House Banking Committee, of which Representative Leach is a
member, which "will make it possible to showcase the idea"). The CFTC, however,
maintains its traditional position that any merger proposal is unnecessary, with
Chairwoman Mary Schapiro going so far as to state that "[y]ou just couldn't find two
agencies working more efficiently." Id. at F2.
182. Agriculture Chief Confirmed, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1995, at Bl.
183. In 1991, Glickman introduced HR 4477, the predecessor to HR 718, which
would have merged the SEC and the CFTC. H.R. 4477, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); see
also H.R. 718, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995). Glickman has called the current regulatory
system "primitive" and "ill-equipped to deal with the evolution of investment products."
Glickman Calls for New Agency to Regulate Futures and Securities, 24 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1162-63 (July 31, 1992). Glickman, testifying in favor of HR
4477 before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, stated that
the bifurcated structure of American financial market regulation "stifles innovation, it
drains resources into turf battles; it confuses overseas investors; and it leaves us illequipped for the pressures and stains [sic] our financial system is likely to face in the
future." Merger Hearings, supra note 58, at 34.
184. Securities and Futures-Related Bills to Make Their Debut in First Week of
Congress, SEC. WEEK, Jan. 2, 1995, at 1, 2.
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The possibility of regulatory reform of the financial markets
does seem to exist, perhaps for the first time since the creation
of the CFTC. In early 1995, members of both parties in Congress introduced various pieces of legislation aimed at reforming the financial markets in general and the securities and
futures markets in particular. 185 Glickman and Wyden together
recently co-sponsored several bills aimed at merging the two
agencies, demonstrating potential bipartisan support for such
a measure. 186
In the past, biennial reauthorization hearings have provided
a forum for raising jurisdictional issues and arguing for
increased SEC regulatory authority. Such hearings were
scheduled to take place in May 1994, 187 but have been delayed
indefinitely. 188 Given both that the Senate Agriculture Committee unanimously approved a bill on February 1, 1995, to
renew . the CFTC for five years, its longest reauthorization
period ever, 189 and that no reauthorization hearings are
presently scheduled, the Leach/Wyden bill and other legislative proposals may provide a more expedient route to change.

CONCLUSION

The current system of financial regulation of the securities
and futures markets is untenable in a world of complex financial instruments and global markets. New instruments
which defy categorical definition are frequently created, and
the current jurisdictional quagmire will continue to stifle

185. Id. at 1-2. The article further notes the favorable political climate for a
merger, which includes a Republican Congress, the ascendancy of Dan Glickman to the
cabinet position of Agriculture Secretary, and support for a merger proposal from SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt. Id. at 2.
186. Glickman, Wyden Introduce Bill to Consolidate SEC, CFTC Regulation, DAILY
REP. FOR EXECS. (BNA) No. 124, at A-15 (June 30, 1993).
187. CFTC Reauthorization Hearings Expected to Begin Later This Month; No
Surprises Anticipated, SEC. WEEK, May 2, 1994, at 6, 6-7. Controversial issues, such as
jurisdiction over certain financial products and fields, were to be left out of the
reauthorization hearings. Id. at 6. The article cites the 1992 reauthorization hearings,
in which such issues delayed final reauthorization for nearly two years and required
two sessions of Congress to do so, as the reason for such omission. Id.
188. Futures, Options: Senate Panel OKs Reauthorizing CFTC, CHI. TRm., Feb. 2,
1995, at 83 (noting that there are no hearings planned in the House on the issue of
reauthorizing the agency).
189. Id.
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innovation and increase costs as the agencies attempt but fai]
to resolve jurisdictional problems that merit a more substantive
solution. Congress' past attempts to alleviate the jurisdictional
disputes, through amendments to the CEA and by requiring
the agencies to maintain communications and cooperate, have
failed to solve the fundamental problems posed by hybrid
instruments which cannot be classified as either "securities" or
"futures contracts."
In addition, the courts are uncomfortable in their role as interagency referees and consider themselves ill-suited for resolving
such complex financial disputes. Indeed, on the issue ofjurisdictional authority over securities options, the Shad/Johnson
Accord between the two agencies resulted in the exact opposite
conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the
same issue. Complex financial issues should not receive such
arbitrary treatment. The solutions to the interagency jurisdictional dispute should not be left to a well-meaning but admittedly underqualified judiciary.
The problems which have plagued the agencies in the past
promise to repeat themselves in an unending cycle. For the
benefit of domestic financial markets and in the interest of the
general public, the SEC and the CFTC should merge into a
single regulatory agency, thereby eliminating costly jurisdictional disputes and restoring the international competitiveness of
domestic markets.

